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ABSTRACT 
"Qualitative immediacy" (also termed "qual i ty" in its philosophical sense 
and "esthetic quality") is of fundamental importance within the pragmatic 
conception of meaning as interpretive act, and yet it has been virtually 
ignored by social scientists. The concept is traced through its foundations in 
Peirce's philosophy, its development in Dewey's theory of esthetic 
experience, and its relation to the general pragmatic conception of the self. 
The importance of the " I "  in Mead's view of the self is seen as similar to 
Firstness in Peirce and esthetic experience in Dewey, Those turning to 
qualitative approaches ought to consider qualitative immediacy as a 
genuine addition to our understanding of human communication. 
One of the distinguishing features of American social 
thought is the emphasis placed on immediacy in experience. 
From Peirce's discussions of "Firstness"--or roughly the phe- 
nomenological present--and James' discussions of "the 
stream of consciousness" through contemporary symbolic in- 
teractionist discussions of the situation, there is a shared 
attempt to get at the directness and flow of events, to grasp 
the mercurial essence that is the vital source of meaning. Crit- 
ics have charged that these attempts in fact miss the impor- 
tance of meaning as a system of conventional rules, that in 
concentrating on the uniqueness of a situation the inquiry 
becomes bogged down in a morass of subjectivity that ignores 
the influence of objective norms and social structures (Lewis, 
1976; Gonos, 1977). Although these criticisms may be accu- 
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rate for some recent trends within symbolic interactionism, 
they ignore or distort the fundamental importance of 
qualitative immediacy within the pragmatic conception of 
meaning as interpretive act. Thus the "qualitative tradition" I 
wil] examine is literally a tradition concerned with "qual i ty"  
in its philosophical sense. I will explore what has been termed 
"qualitative immediacy" or "esthetic quality" in the context 
of the pragmatic tradition by tracing its importance to the 
theories of meaning and communication of C.S. Peirce, John 
Dewey, and G.H. Mead. 
The origins of the philosophy of pragmatism are not to be 
found, as it is often thought, in the work of Will iam James, 
but rather in that of his lifelong colleague, Charles Sanders 
Peirce. It can be argued that the foundations for pragmatism 
can be discovered in an early series of articles Peirce wrote in 
the late 1860s criticizing the Cartesian quest for indubitable 
foundations of thought (Peirce, 5:213-357). ~ When Descartes 
borrowed the Augustinian notion "1 think, therefore I am," as 
the clear and distinct idea that could provide a foundation for 
thought, he helped launch a view that saw direct immediate 
knowledge as the goal of inquiry. Through introspection one 
could peel away the vaguenesses and uncertainties of the 
world and attain the realm beyond doubt-- the cogito or 
subjective self-consciousness. "Of  thine eye I am Eyebeam," 
said Emerson's Sphinx in his poem, The Sphinx, and similarly 
Peirce would probably argue that the Cartesian quest to at- 
tain the pure "1" through introspection (as if the "eye" could 
see itself), can only end in blindness, as it did for Oedipus. The 
point of Peirce's early articles is that all thought or 
knowledge, including self-knowledge, is inferential and gen- 
eral, that is, it is of the nature of a sign, and it takes time to oc- 
cur. Thus even in a late article, Peirce (1905) answers his own 
question--"What is the bearing of the Present instant upon 
conduct"--  by replying: 
Introspection is whoI!y a matter of inference. One is immediately 
conscious of his Feelings, no doubt; but not that they are feelings of 
an ego. The self is only inferred. ]'here is no time in the Present for any 
inference at all, least of all for inference concerning that very instant 
(Peirce, 5:462). 
Here Peirce is arguing against immediate knowledge 
through "introspection" or " intuit ion," terms which usually 
suggest unmediated direct inner perception. Yet he does ac- 
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knowledge the pervasive inf luence of the present when he 
says, "One is immediately conscious of his Feelings." Peirce 
distinguishes feeling from emotion, because for him emot ion 
is a kind of inference, interpretation, or " k n o w l e d g e " - -  
"Thirdness" as I explain later. By " fee l ing"  Peirce means qual- 
ity or "Firstness," " . . .  an instance of that sort of element of 
consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself, regard- 
less of anything else" (Peirce, 1:306). 2 In his view, qual i tat ive 
immediacy is an essential element of an experience, yet the 
meaning of any experience does not consist in its immediacy 
per se, but in its relation to past experiences through 
continual interpretat ion dependent on the future. Peirce 
obviously defines the present much more str ict ly than Mead 
(1932), who includes du ra t i on - -a  l itt le bit of the past and 
fu tu re- -as  an element of the present. Perhaps a better term 
for Mead's present would be " the emergent present." 
Al though qual i ty  is logical ly ( though not necessarily tem- 
porally) prior to actuali ty, we never encounter "pu re "  ex- 
amples of it apart from its embodiment.  Instead we can think 
about or infer the qual i ty  by "bracket ing of f ,"as phenomenol- 
ogists say, the questions of its existence and relation to other 
things. But qual i tat ive immediacy is not pr imari ly a 
knowledge affair, it is something we experience direct ly in the 
present as feeling. Peirce gives some examples which 
i l lustrate the sui generis nature of qual i tat ive immediacy: 
The poetic mood approaches the state in which the present appears 
as it is present . . . .  The present is just what it is regardless of the 
absent, regardless of past and future . . . .  Imagine, if you please, a 
consciousness in which there is no comparison, no relation, no 
recognized multiplicity (since parts would be other than the whole), 
no change, no imagination of any modification of what is positively 
there, no reflexion--nothing but a simple positive character. Such a 
consciousness might be just an odour, say a smell of attar; or it might 
be the hearing of a piercing eternal whistle. In short, any simple and 
positive quality of feeling would be something which our description 
fits that it is such as it is quite regardless of anything else. The quality 
of feeling is the true psychical representative of the first category of 
the immediate as it is in its immediacy, of the present in its direct 
positive presentness (Peirce 5:44). 
Because Peirce's phi losophy is fundamental ly  in opposit ion 
to the idea of unmediated knowledge of the present, the last 
thing he would want  to say is that we " k n o w "  qualit ies of 
immediacy. Instead, qual i tat ive immediacy is something that 
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can be felt, as a feeling, but not known in the present (Peirce, 
1:310). Dewey also, as wil l  be discussed later, emphasized that 
qualit ies are felt, or in his words, "had, "  rather than known. 
The importance of qual i tat ive immediacy in Peirce's view is 
that it contains possibil it ies for experience. Its mode of being 
is not absolutely determined by its existential embodiment  
( "upon the fact that some material thing possesses it"), nor by 
a knowing mind. Peirce argues that potental i ty  is itself 
genuine, and that a common mistake of nominalists lies in~ 
" . . . h o l d i n g  that  the potential, or possible, is nothing but  
what  the actual makes it to be" (Peirce, 1:422). Thus in trying 
to del ineate a mode of being concerned wi th  potential i ty,  
wi th  what  "migh t  happen," Peirce tried to account  for the 
importance of immediacy in experience, as well  as showing 
how essential it is to novelty, uniqueness, to the creative 
aspect of human experience and the wor ld at large. 
Qual i tat ive immediacy has its importance wi th in the inter- 
pretive sign process or med ia t ion - - tha t  is, "Th i rdness" - -as  
well. In this regard it should be ment ioned that  Peirce 
distinguishes three elemental categories of all phenomena: 
Firstness, or qual i ty  as described here; Secondness, or the 
actua l i ty  of ex is tence- - "o therness , "  struggle, dyadic  
reaction; and Thirdness, or mediation, representation, 
in te rpre ta t ion- -what  is usually thought  of as knowledge or 
thought. All inferences are instances of Thirdness. Firstness is 
involved in Secondness, and both are involved in Thirdness. 
Peirce tried to show how the signs const i tut ing language and 
thought  are never absolutely "c lear and dist inct ,"  a¢ la 
Descartes, but rather that an essential feature of all 
communicat ion is what  he defined as vagueness, which is the 
i n v o l v e m e n t  of q u a l i t a t i v e  p o s s i b i l i t y  w i t h i n  the 
communicat ive sign process: 
A sign is objectively vague, in so far as, leaving its interpretation more 
or less indeterminate, it reserves for some other possible sign or 
experience the function of completing the determination .... No 
communication of one person to another can be entirely definite, i.e., 
non-vague.., wherever degree or any other possibility of continuous 
variation subsists, absolute precision is impossible. Much else must be 
vague, because no man's interpretation of words is based on exactly 
the same experience as any other man's. Even in our most intellectual 
conceptions, the more we strive to be precise, the more unattainable 
precision seems. It should never be forgotten that our own thinking is 
carried on as a dialogue, and though mostly in a lesser degree, is 
subject to almost every imperfection of language (Peirce, 5:505-506). 
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Vagueness seems to be the very thing that positivism tried 
to destroy and yet, in the way Peirce describes it, vagueness 
can provide a very useful methodological tool for obtaining 
objectivity in empirical social research. By reserving "for 
some other possible sign or experience the function of 
completing the determination," the researcher can design 
questions that impose the burden of defining the scope of the 
situation or problem on the respondent, rather than on the a 
priori assumptions of the researcher. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Peirce's formulation 
of pragmatism for sociology is that all meaning is a 
communicative act oriented toward ultimate ends, a 
continuous sign process (Rochberg-Halton, 1982). More 
precisely, each and every sign, in his definition, constitutes a 
communicative act. Peirce defines a sign as: 
...something which stands to somebody for something in some 
respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed 
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. 
This sign stands for something, its object (Peirce, 2:228) 
A sign then consists of the triadic representation of some 
object (in the broader grammatical sense) to an interpreting 
sign--or interpretant, and thus intrinsically involves 
communication. Because it also takes time to occur, a sign is 
by this definition a sign-process, a communicative act. And 
because the interpretant is itself a sign, it also "addresses" 
another interpretant, in a continuing process of interpretation 
and communication. In Peirce's simplest threefold division of 
signs, he distinguishes symbolic signs, which convey meaning 
through convention or rule, for example, linguistic symbols; 
indexical signs, which convey information by being physically 
afffected by their objects, for example, weathervanes 
indicate the direction of the wind by being pushed by it; and 
iconic signs, which convey information by qualitatively 
embodying the object, for example, a painting "represents" 
itself in its own qualities. The fact that there are conventions 
for landscape painting are not the determining factor in the 
experience of seeing a given landscape from the iconic 
perspective. What is important are the qualities of the 
painting itself--or even how conventions of landscape 
painting might be directly embodied in the qualities of the 
painting. 
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Iconic signs, in this threefold division of signs (Peirce 
actually developed more detailed divisions of signs which 
need not be discussed here), are signs of qualitative 
immediacy, and as such, signify the qualitative possibility or 
pervasive quality of the communicative act. Although Peirce 
wrote very little on esthetic experience, he seems to have 
taken a position very similar to Dewey's theory of esthetic 
experience discussed in the next section of this article: 
• . .  it seems to me that while in esthetic enjoyment we attend to the 
totality of feeling--and especially to the total resultant Quality of 
Feeling presented in the work of art we are contemplating--yet it is a 
sort of intellectual sympathy, a sense that here is a Feeling that one 
can comprehend, a reasonable Feeling• I do not succeed in saying 
exactly what it is, but it is a consciousness belonging to the category 
of Representation, though representing something in the Category of 
Qua]ity of Feeling (Peirce, 5:113). 
By "Category of Quality of Feeling" Peirce means that the 
esthetic experience essentially involves a sign of Firstness, or 
iconicity in his simplest threefold division of signs. Peirce also 
discussed the communication of qualitative immediacy in his 
theory of signs as the tone of a sign (Peirce, 4:537; 8:363), a 
distinction that has not been used much to date. It forms the 
first level of a threefold distinction between tone, token, and 
type. The esthetic element of experience, as Dewey would 
later elaborate, involves the communication of qualitative 
signs, whose meaning is the quality conveyed regardless of 
what conventions may be used to express that quality. 
Therefore, although an act always possesses its own 
inherent quality or character, the meaning always addresses a 
future interpretation. Thus the pragmatic meaning of any act 
is the possible conceivable effects it might have on future 
conduct, not just the actual behaviors or mechanical motions 
produced in the act. Although Peirce, who was primarily a 
logician, did not write much on esthetic experience, Dewey 
dealt with it extensively in his later philosophy. So to get a 
better understanding of qualitative immediacy in esthetic 
experience we should turn to Dewey. 
QUALITATIVE IMMEDIACY AND ESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
IN DEWEY 
Qualitative immediacy is one of the essential--and one of 
the most overlooked--features of John Dewey's theory of 
experience. Despite the fact that Dewey's theory of 
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communicat ion figured prominently in the Park and Burgess 
introductory sociology text, most sociologists seem to be 
aware of the " instrumental ist"  and "pragmat ist"  Dewey, one 
who emphasizes meanings and actions as aimed toward 
uti l i tarian goals. And as one sociologist recently said, Dewey 
is often seen as portraying an image of man as " . . . a n  
unsocialized calculating man of the jungle" (Lewis, 1976:357). 
But these are simply caricatures of Dewey's thought as he 
himself showed in responding to early criticisms: 
No misconception of the instrumental logic has been more persistent 
than the belief that it makes knowledge merely a means to a practical 
end, or to the satisfaction of practical needs--practical being taken 
to signify some quite definite utilities of a material or bread and 
butter type . . . .  But I again affirm that the term "pragmatic" means 
only the rule of referring all thinking, all reflective considerations, to 
consequences for final meaning and test. Nothing is said about the 
nature of the consequences; they may be aesthetic,, or moral, or 
political, or religious in quality--anything you please (Dewey, 
1916:330). 
Philosophical pragmatism is thus the opposite of modern 
everyday usage of "pragmat ic"  as expediency. Despite some 
important differences between Dewey's and Peirce's versions 
of pragmat ism--which were largely resolved as Dewey 
became increasingly influenced by Peirce in his later 
l i f e - b o t h  shared a view of human conduct as oriented 
toward ends through self-control, rather than as ul t imately 
motivated by origins or mechanistic determinants. And both 
saw the ult imate end of human action not merely as a 
uti l i tarian adaption or rationalistic knowledge, but as the 
growth and embodiment of intelligence, in Peirce's words, 
"concrete reasonableness." They attempted to show how the 
summum bonum is not some abstract unattainable ideal, but 
a living presence in all human conduct. Their perspectives 
complemented each other as Richard Bernstein (1971:200ff.) 
has pointed out. 
Peirce was primari ly a logician and scientist, yet he came to 
develop a view that saw truth as dependent upon goodness 
(that is, logic upon ethics), and goodness in turn dependent 
upon beauty (that is, ethics upon esthetics), the qualitative or 
esthetic ideal of the intrinsically admirable. In contrast to 
Peirce's image of man as scientific inquirer, Dewey's 
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perspect ive emphasizes man as craftsman, capable of 
bui ld ing and cu l t iva t ing the purposes of life. Dewey (1938) 
also dealt  w i th  the logic of inquiry, and the moral inf luence of 
phi losophy (Dewey, 1946), yet  one of his most impor tant  
cont r ibut ions is his discussion of the role of qua l i ta t ive  
immediacy in situations, and especial ly the nature of esthetic 
experience. 
Dewey f i rst  elaborated his theory of qua l i ta t ive  immediacy 
in Experience and Nature (1925). He described, for example, 
how qual i t ies became infused wi th  intel l igence or mind in the 
course of human evolut ion,  and how this does not make man 
simply an evolved homo sapiens, an abstract knower, but  also 
a being capable of communicating the fe l t  qual i t ies of his or 
her existence: 
As life is a character of events in a peculiar condition of organization, 
and "feeling" is a quality of life-forms marked by complexly mobile 
and discriminating responses, so "mind" is an added property 
assumed by a feeling creature, when it reaches that organized 
interaction with other living creatures which is language, 
communication . . . .  This state of things in which qualitatively 
different feelings are not just had but are significant of objective 
differences, is mind. Feelings are no longer just felt. They have and 
they make sense; record and prophesy {Dewey, 1925:258). 
Whereas the experience or act of th ink ing does have its 
own inherent qual i ty ,  i t  di f fers f rom experiences that  are 
acknowledged to be esthetic, such as art, " bu t  only in its 
mater ials."  This is because the prominent  signs in th ink ing are 
symbolic, whi le the prominent  signs in esthetic experience are 
iconic, using Peirce's simple threefold div is ion ment ioned 
earlier. Dewey develops this idea fur ther  in his Art as 
Experience: 
The material of fine arts consists of qualities; that of experience 
having intellectual conclusion are signs or symbols having no intrinsic 
quality of their own, but standing for things that may in another 
experience be qualitatively experienced. The difference is 
enormous .. . .  Nevertheless, the experience itself (of thinking) has a 
satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration 
and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement. 
This artistic structure may be immediately felt. In so far, it is 
esthetic...no intellectual activity is an integral event (is an 
experience), unless it is rounded out with this quality. Without it 
thinking is inconclusive (Dewey, 1958:38). 
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So even though intellectual experience is quite different from 
esthetic experience, there is still an element of the esthetic 
involved in it. The esthetic element is what constitutes that 
neglected realm of human thought celebrated by Will iam 
Blake, the Imagination, which in his view dreamed us into 
existence. 
In Dewey's perspective, "esthetic" refers specifically to 
quality rather than being a synonum for "artistic." He does 
distinguish art as "a process of doing or making" from the 
esthetic as the complementary perceiving and enjoying 
perspective, denoting "the consumer's rather than the pro- 
ducer's standpoint" (Dewey, 1958:47). But the esthetic is not 
simply the enjoyment of art, as commonly thought. Instead it 
is what gives unity to all experience: " . . . n o  experience of 
whatever sort is a unity unless it has esthetic quality; (Dewey, 
1958:40). The esthetic is the partner of the instrumental in the 
communicative act; it is the consummation or completion of 
the experience: 
Discourse itself is both instrumental and consummatory. Communica- 
tion is an exchange which procures something wanted; it involves a 
claim, appeal, order, direction or request . . . .  Communicat ion is also 
an immediate enhancement of life, enjoyed for its own 
sake . . . .  Language is always a form of action and in its instrumental 
use is always a means of concerted action for an end, whi le at the 
same time it finds in itself all the goods of its possible consequences. 
For there is no mode of action as ful f i l l ing and as rewarding as is con- 
certed consensus of action. It brings with it the sense of sharing and 
merging in a whole (Dewey, 1925;183-184). 
/ .  / 
Esthetic esperience, or the perception (aisthetikos = 
perceptive) of the inherent qualities of the object, act, or 
situation, does involve prior habits of convention or inter- 
pretation -- the instrumental--but does not, strictly speaking, 
depend on these for its meaning. The reason for this is that 
from the esthetic perspective, the inherent quality itself is the 
subject of the experience, and not the experiencer. True, if 
there is to be an esthetic experience there must be an ex- 
periencer with a potential for realizing the esthetic quality. 
But the esthetic meaning is possessed by the quality of the 
total transaction, not just by the experiencer. Mead also ex- 
pressed this idea in an article on "The Nature of Aesthetic Ex- 
perience" published in 1926, a year after Dewey's Experience 
and Nature, which Mead claimed was an influence on him: 
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The beatitude that permeates the common striving of men after an in- 
finite God of their salvation belongs to the cathedral. The delight 
which follows upon successful adjustment of one's body to the 
varied...elements of a landscape flows over into the landscape 
itself . . . .  In the aesthetic appreciation of the works of great artists, 
what we are doing is capturing values of enjoyment there, which f i l l  
out and interpret our own interests in living and doing. They have per- 
manent value because they are the language of delight into which 
men can translate the meaning of their own existence (Mead, 
1938:454, 457). 
Again, the locus of the esthetic experience is neither ex- 
clusively subjective nor objective, but is in the "pervasive 
quality" of the act (Bernstein, t967:94-96; Rochberg-Halton, 
1979a, 1979b). 
The experiencer "has" or "feels" the qualities of the 
esthetic transaction, rather than only indirectly "knowing" 
them. The difference here is perhaps like that between a per- 
son immediately enjoying a painting, and an art critic reflec- 
tively analyzing and comparing the qualities of the painting. 
The former activity is esthetic, the latter intellectual or 
critical. This is the difference between prizing and appraising, 
between valuing and valuation, between the immediately 
possessed and the reflectively understood (Dewey, 1939). 
Poetry may make use of conventional linguistic symbols, and 
even be expressed in conventional linguistic form, yet it is the 
unique qualities expressed that give the poem its esthetic 
significance. 
In Art as Experience Dewey also discussed the role of 
esthetic quality in the communicative act by returning to the 
literal meaning of the term perception-to feel or take in. 
There Dewey distinguishes between recognition, in which an 
object's meaning is solely dependent on previous habits of in- 
terpretation, and perception, in which an object's meaning in- 
cludes its unique qualities as well as a person's culturally 
conditioned habits of interpretation (Rochberg-Halton, 1979a, 
1979b; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981). 
Recognition is "arrested perception," in which all meaning oc- 
curs within the bubble of received cultural convention, and 
where the qualities of the object have no effect on its inter- 
pretation. For this reason recognition is an-esthetic, because 
there is no "feeling" in Dewey's and Peirce's sense of this 
t~rm. What is important about the perceptive experience is 
that a person can learn something new, can have an ex- 
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perience. Through esthetic experience we open ourselves to 
the spontaneities, the serendipities, the qualities of the 
surrounding world and make them our own. 
The lack of attention given to esthetic quality is another of 
the effects of the Cartesian world in which we live. Social 
scientists tend to ignore esthetic quality as if it were solely a 
matter of convention, or else physiology. As parodied by 
Alfred North Whitehead, this spectre of the nominalistic 
"ghost in the machine" would have us believe that: 3 
The occurrences of nature are in some ways apprehended by minds 
which are associated with living bodies .. . .  But the mind in apprehen- 
ding also experiences sensations which, properly speaking, are 
qualities of the mind alone. These sensations are projected by the 
mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies in external nature. Thus the 
bodies are perceived as with qualities that do not belong to them, 
qualities which in fact are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus 
nature gets credit which in truth should be reserved for ourselves: the 
rose for its scent: the nightingale for his song: and the sun for his ra- 
diance .. . .  Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colorless; 
merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly {quoted in 
Bernstein, 1967:89-90). 
in Dewey's pragmatic view, however, esthetic quality is 
neither wholly "wi th in" the person nor the thing, rather it 
"belongs" as much to the thing as it does to the person, and 
can only be realized within the transaction. 
Esthetic quality does have important consequences for the 
cultivation of the self, as both Dewey and Mead argued. And 
James Mark Balkwin, a colleague of the pragmatists, and the 
source of inspiration for Jean Piaget's theories of cognitive 
development, proposed a detailed theory of esthetic 
development that has been lost in the field of cognitive 
developmental psychology because of Piaget's emphasis on 
the cognitive and "logical" (see Parsons, 1980). But in the 
perspective outlined here it could be argued that esthetic 
quality is the most prominent feature of the infant's world. A 
feeling of warmth or irritation can be the infant's entire 
universe at this early stage of development. The infant, 
however, cannot yet be said to possess a self, for it has not yet 
learned to develop habits of self-control. When the self does 
begin to develop it has its own esthetic quality, or what 
traditionally has been called "character," which is always 
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open to further cultivation. Esthetic quality or qualitative 
immediacy thus may be one of the most important consti- 
tuents of the self, because it makes genuinely 
new developments of the self possible, Turning to the 
pragmatic tradition we see that qualitative immediacy is 
regarded as an essential feature of the self. 
IMMEDIACY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF 
Dewey and Mead, l ike Peirce, emphasize the 
communicative act as the locus of social life. And like Peirce 
they both see the communicative act itself as ful ly social and 
objective, even when it occurs within a single person. Dewey 
said, for example, concerning the modern emphasis on 
individuality and private experience: 
The modern discovery of inner experience.., implies a new worth and 
sense of dignity in human individuality, a sense that an individual is 
not a mere property of nature, set in place according to a scheme 
independent of him, as an article is put in its place in a cabinet, but 
that he adds something, that he makes a contribution . . . .  But here 
also distortion entered in. Failure to recognize that this world of inner 
experience is dependent upon an extension of language which is a 
social product and operation led to the subjectivistic, solipsistic, and 
egotistic strain in modern thought (Dewey, 1925:172-173). 
Thus even individuality in Dewey's and Mead's views is 
ful ly socialized. There is no "real me" who lies beneath the 
social persona or mask. The persona is not simply the veil of 
illusion, obscuring the really real beneath it; it constitutes the 
very social fabric of the serf itself. 
In the pragmatic view the self is not based on some 
underlying "cardinal conception" as Cartesians might claim, 
but instead is a living, feeling, communicative sign-process 
oriented toward goals through self-control. The self is created 
and grows only by a process of internalizing the surrounding 
social world through the communicative medium of gestures, 
artifacts, and language. Intelligent human communication 
always involves community, which Mead termed "the 
generalized other," because even our own thought is an 
internal dialogue with representations of community, for 
example, language itself° In Peirce's words: 
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.. a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he 
is "saying to himself," that is, saying to that other self that is just 
coming into l i fe in the f low of time. When one reasons, it is that 
crit ical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever 
is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language. The second thing to 
remember is that the man's circle of society (however widely or 
narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely 
compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of 
an individual organism (Peirce, 5:421). 
"The man's circle of society," which acts as a "sort of 
loosely compacted person" for Peirce, is similar to Mead's 
concept of the generalized other--that set of attitudes of 
interpretation which become internalized in the creation of 
the self through the process of role taking. It is also possible 
to interpret Peirce's statement in terms of the dialectic of the 
"1" and the "me" discussed by Mead, who acquired it, with 
changes, from William James. When Peirce says that a 
person's thoughts are what he is "saying to himself" and that 
it is "that critical self that one is trying to persuade," he is 
emphasizing the dialogical nature of thought. The 
interpreting thought, or interpretant, or "critical self", can be 
directly translated into Mead's terminology as "the 
generalized other," or "the me." That which is addressing the 
me is the first element of a sign, remembering that in Peirce's 
triadic definition a sign consists of sign, its object, and its 
interpretant. This element is the "1." That which is 
"discussed" is the object of the sign, or object of the "1" "me" 
dialogue. In Peirce's semiotic another definition of a sign is 
that it is: 
• •. a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, 
called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its 
Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which 
it stands itself to the same Object (Peirce, 2:274). 
In other words, that which addresses the interpretant is of the 
category Firstness, or qualitative immediacy. The sign as a 
triadic whole is Thirdness, but it involves this Firstness. The 
upshot of the argument then is that the " I "  is the element of 
qualitative immediacy within the communicative act. The 
many commentators on Mead's " I "  miss the essential point he 
is trying to make--that the emergent present is what 
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introduces novelty, the unpredictable and unexpected, into 
the self, and that reflection is always an interpretation of 
what is already past. The present is the "1," the reflective 
interpretation, the "me. ''4 
It should be added that Mead seems to reverse James' 
formulation of the "1" and "'me" in some ways, which seem to 
me to overcome the inherent dualism in James. James 
expresses the distinction in "The Consciousness of Self," in his 
masterwork, The Principles of Psychology: 
We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant 
presence of two elements, an objective person, known by a passing 
subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in time. Hereafter 
let us use the words ME and I for the empirical person and the judging 
Thought . . . .  If the passing thought be the directly verifiable existent 
which no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought itself 
is the thinker, and psychology need not look beyond (James, 1890:371, 
401). 
james suggests here that the " l "  is the direct knower in the 
stream of consciousness rather than the interpreting "me" or 
reflective mediation, thus falling prey, it seems to me, to a 
variant of Cartesian dualism. Dewey criticized this tendency 
to dualism in James, in an article called, "The Vanishing 
Subject in the Psychology of James" (Dewey 1946:396-409). 
There may seem to be some similarity between James' 
"judging Thought" and Mead's use of the "1" as "response." 
Lewis has argued convincingly that Mead speaks of the " l "  as 
response, but Lewis seems to think of the response as the 
immediate action produced, or even the physiological 
functioning of the unconscious moment--in other words, 
quantitative immediacy rather than qualitative immediacy as 
described here. Lewis (1979:278-281) does offer an 
interpretation of the " I "  as "imagery" which has some 
similarities to the interpretation given here, but in seeing 
imagery or inherent quality as reducible to the "neurological 
conditions" that determine the behavioristic response of the 
"1," he makes it seem as if qualitative immediacy could not 
be dealt with by the pragmatic tradition. But I would suggest 
that Mead's use of "response" is similar to Dewey's discussion 
of the consummatory phase of the act described earlier--that 
is, the esthetic--which Mead (1938:23-25) himself discusses. 
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The importance of the "1" in Mead's view of the self is in 
many respects similar to Firstness--feeling or qual i ty-- in 
Peirce and esthetic experience in Dewey. It is the element that 
enables emergence, novelty, originality, uniqueness, creative 
impulse, and free expression (both good and bad) to enter into 
the self-process and endow it with vitality and growth. In 
Mead's words (1934:178) the " I "  is something, "that is never 
entirely calculable." It is always somewhat different from 
what is expected by the "me," the conventional and habitual 
(Mead, 1934:209), and is in this sense novel. Mead says in 
various passages: 
That movement into the future is the step, so to speak, of the ego, of 
the "1." It is something that is not given in the " m e " . . . .  The "1" gives 
the sense of freedom, of ini t iat ive . . . .  However careful ly we plan the 
future i t  always is di f ferent from that which we can previse, and this 
something that we are cont inual ly bringing in and adding to is what 
we identi fy wi th the self that comes into the level of our experience 
only in the complet ion of the act . . . .  Now it is this l iving act which 
never gets directly into reflective experience. It is only after the act 
has taken place that we can catch i t  in our memory and place it in 
terms of that which we have done. It is that "1" which we may be said 
to be cont inual ly  trying to realize, and to realize through the actual 
conduct itself (Mead, 1934:177, 203). 
Many interpreters have taken this placing of the "1" outside 
of the conventional to mean that it is some kind of 
unmediated knowledge, transcendental ego, or direct 
perception, but it seems clear from the remarks quoted here 
that the "1" is the immediate rather than the unmediated. 
More precisely it is the immediate phase of mediation, rather 
than something outside of or prior to the mediation process. 
The "1" cannot be separated from the inferential sign process 
that constitutes the self, rather it is that process of mediation 
or interpretation considered in its immediacy. It is not simply 
reducible to mediation since it does carry its own potential as 
qualitative immediacy. But just as importantly, it has no 
separate existence of its own. For this separate "1", the 
"private I" if you will, is the fiction of modern individualism. 
Mead himself'(1934:209) discussed how modern art often 
seemed to be a demand for the unconventional and 
unmediated, or even the destruction of all mediation, in a 
quest for pure novelty, the pure "1". He did not live long 
enough to see the Cartesian blindness produced by certain 
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late modernists--empty canvasses, silent music, and very 
blank verse--but he certainly would have agreed that the 
quest to grasp the pure " I "  could only amount to the plucking 
out of creative vision rather than its realization. The moder- 
nist emphasis on the pure originality, novelty, and uniqueness 
of the "private I" is as one-sided, from the pragmatic perspec- 
tive, as that of many pre-literate peoples whose self is deter- 
mined almost exclusively by the "me," and for whom in- 
dividuality means to be an "enemy of society" (Turner, 
1975:27). But even there, the " I "  may be personified by a 
single individual such as the king or village headman, who is 
relatively freer from everyday constraints and norms to ex- 
press choice, initiative, caprice, and novelty. Or the " I "  may 
be embodied in the role of the medicine man or shaman, 
whose liminal position makes him the embodiment of the ex- 
ploratory "I," the diviner of things to come (Turner, 1967:ch. 
6). 
Thus the importance of qualitative immediacy in the 
pragmatists' conceptions of the self is that it gives due to the 
uniqueness and creative potentiality of the person, and at the 
same time includes these qualities as social constituents of 
the self, rather than as a-social attributes of individualism, un- 
conditioned by the communicative act. The meaning of uni- 
queness, individuality, and originality always resides in and 
for the discourse of the common good, the cultivation of the 
community both within and outside the individual person. 
IS THERE ROOM FOR QUALITY WITHIN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY? 
By" now it is generally acknowledged that a turn toward 
more "qualitative" or "interpretive" approaches is being 
taken within the social sciences (Geertz, 1973, 1980; Berns- 
tein, 1976; Smith, 1978). The limitations of purely quantitative 
approaches that to a great extent have dominated mid- 
century sociology and psychology have become increasingly 
apparent and many sociologists have attempted to reach out 
for conceptual frameworks that can adequately deal with the 
human communication of meaning. But too often it can be 
argued that these frameworks are only "conceptual" or 
"cognitive," and as such, merely a continuation of the 
modern emphasis on epistemology over ontology, "knowing" 
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over "having" or "feeling." There does not seem to be much 
room for qualitative immediacy as discussed here to be con- 
sidered an essential element of communication. 
Perhaps phenomenology attempts to concentrate on this 
qualitative element of experience, but at least as proposed by 
Husserl, it conceives of qualities as Cartesian "objects of 
knowledge." Symbolic interactionism, the self-claimed child 
of pragmatism, with its emphasis on the uniqueness of the 
communicative act, would seem to illustrate the approaches 
described here, but at least as defined by its definer, Herbert 
Blumer, it does not seem to allow for inherent and immediate 
qualities as constituents of all experience and as elements of 
the communicative act: 
An object - - that  is to say, anything that an individual indicates to 
himself-- is different from a stimulus; instead of having an intrinsic 
character which acts on the individual and which can be identified 
apart from the individual, its character is conferred on it by the in- 
dividual (Blumer, 1967:141 ; 1969:4ff). 
The problem with symbolic interactionism is given in its ti- 
tle: it is a view of meaning and experience as symbolic, which 
does not include the iconic or qualitative signs as con- 
tributing in their own right to the communicative process. 
Perhaps the inclusion of qualitative immediacy could clarify 
symbolic interactionist discussions of why a "situation" 
should be considered unique by showing that uniqueness is 
qualitative rather than subjective. 
Piaget's "cognitive developmental" psychology is an ex- 
cellent example of an influential conceptualistic and ra- 
tionalistic theory that has no room for qualitative immediacy. 
But the paradox is that Piaget's theory, as mentioned earlier, 
is founded on that of James Mark Baldwin, a colleague of the 
pragmatists, who developed a theory of "esthetic develop- 
ment" within his general "genetic epistemology" (Parsons, 
1980). An esthetically based theory might provide a wholly 
different view of human development. 
I have tried to make use of these pragmatic approaches to 
qualitative immediacy within the communicative act in my 
own empirical research on the meaning of household posses- 
sions (Rochberg-Halton, 1979a, 1979b; Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton, 1981). In describing how things acquire 
meaning it became important to distinguish different modes 
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of meaning or modes of transaction with things. The domi- 
nant conceptuaiist and structuralist views of culture as a 
"system of symbols and meanings," mediated solely by con- 
ventional norms did not seem to account for the active pro- 
cess often described by respondents, nor for the importance 
of the intrinsic quality of the thing as an element of the com- 
municative act. Dewey's description of esthetic experience 
and Peirce's "iconicity" seemed to provide a broader perspec- 
tive for interpretation than the purely "conventional" ac- 
counts. 
We so often think of pragmatism as the voice of American 
practicality, yet it should be clear by now that the very 
ground of pragmatism is qualitative immediacy, a concept 
that undercuts both the positivistic "atoms" and solitary 
"cogitos" of modern social thought. Presently, however, the 
concept of qualitative immediacy remains for the most part 
an unexplored possibility. But perhaps it is time for those 
turning to qualitative approaches to consider qualitative im- 
mediacy, the long dormant vital source of the pragmatic 
tradition, as a welcome addition to our understanding of the 
nature of human being. 
NOTES 
1References to the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce appear as volume 
number and paragraph; for example, 5:135. 
2This definition of feeling comes very close to the kind of study proposed in 
philosophical phenomenology (Husserl, 1973; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Schutz, 1970), 
and indeed, the analysis of qualitative immediacy considered as "phaneron," formed 
the basis of Peirce's own brand of phenomenology, which he developed independent- 
ly of Husserl and originally termed "phaneroscopy" to avoid confusing it with Hegel's 
phenomenology. The purpose of phaneroscopy is to ascertain the elemental 
categories present to mind. Peirce's "epochS" is more radical than Husserl's, 
however, in that it also excludes any notion of "transcendental subjectivity" as per- 
taining to the "phaneron" (See Rosensohn, 1974, for a discussion of Peirce's 
phenomenology), 
3John Locke's discussion of primary and secondary qualities illustrates the perspec- 
tive Whitehead had in mind: 
What I have said concerning colours and smells may be understood also of 
tastes and sounds, and other like sensible qualities; which, whatever reality we 
by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, 
but powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on those primary 
qualities, viz~ bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts . . . .  They are, in the 
bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in 
us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and 
motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so. (Vo]. 
1, Book II, ch. 8, par. 14, 15). 
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~One reading of Jorge Luis Borge's short story, "'Borges and 1," is that it is a literary 
realization of the I and me dialogue of the self. Borges himself claims that James 
made a strong impression on him (interview, The University of Chicago, April 1, 1980). 
Even if James is not one of the sources for the piece, Borges' dialogue of pronouns 
does illustrate the I and me distinction, as illustrated in the fol lowing excerpts: 
The other one, the one called Borges, is the one things happen t o . . .  It would 
be an exaggeration to say that ours is a hostile relationship; I live, let myself go 
on living, so that Borges may contrive his literature, and this literature justifies 
me . . . .  Besides, I am destined to perish, definitively, and only some instant of 
myself can survive in h im. . .  I shall remain in Borges, not in myself (if it is true 
that I am someone), but I recognize myself less in his books than in many 
others or in the laborious strumming of a gu i tar . . .  I do not know which of us 
has written this page. 
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